March 18, 2009

Wolterstorff is a careful student of the 'bob and weave' school of philosophical polemics

from The Immanent Frame ifblog@ssrc.org to Tusar Mohapatra tusarnmohapatra@gmail.com date 18 Mar 2009 01:07 subject Wolterstorff and Smith discuss "Justice" The Immanent Frame Secularism, religion, and the public sphere

New at The Immanent Frame, an extended exchange between Nicholas Wolterstorff and James K. A. Smith:
Nicholas Wolterstorff: “The fine texture: A response to Smith
“I am at a loss to understand why Smith thinks that I have 'absorbed the atomistic individualism of modern liberalism'—why he thinks that I am a 'Whig Calvinist.' I hold that rights are a species of normative social relationships; sociality is of the essence of rights. A right is a right to the good of being treated a certain way by one’s fellows or by some social entity. I hold that social entities of various sorts have rights, and that, conversely, they are quite capable of violating the rights of you and me. I furthermore hold that rights are grounded in what respect for worth requires; rights are not, in my view, protectors of autonomy. So where is the individualism?” View this full post.

James K. A. Smith: “'Bob and weave': A response to Wolterstorff
“Nicholas Wolterstorff’s calm, careful, humble response to my posts might make me look like an overly pugilistic polemicist. But I think he’s just from a different school of pugilism. (As a Canadian and long-time hockey player, I think pugilism is a great way to spend a Friday night, with beers afterward.) Wolterstorff is a careful student of the 'bob and weave' school of philosophical polemics, turning ill-advised haymakers into merely glancing blows. I, on the other hand, tend to be a student of the George Foreman school of philosophical polemics (and frequent user of his grills to boot!): I’m easily sucked in by rope-a-dopes. Why stop now?” View this full post.

Also new at The Immanent Frame
Nicholas Wolterstorff: “Secular accounts: A response to Chambers
John D. Boy: “The fanantical counterpublic

The Immanent Frame is now on Facebook. Become a fan here. The Immanent Frame is a production of the Social Science Research Council1 Pierrepont Plaza - Brooklyn, NY 11201 - USA - ifblog@ssrc.org Learn more about the SSRC’s work on religion & the public sphere

March 17, 2009

We no longer live in the times of either-or

Re: The Core Problem
by koantum on Mon 16 Mar 2009 05:47 PM PDT Profile Permanent Link

Dear All, The points I would have raised in response to Kepler's comments here and with regard to my review of his review of The Book have indeed mostly been made by now. The gist is of course that we no longer live in the times of either-or.

As the Mother once exclaimed in the course of a conversation, it's not this OR that but this AND that AND that...

No individual effort counts for much, but all together and the Force that secretly concerts them do. I would like to draw your attention to the article "Transformations and Transformers: Spirituality and the Academic Study of Mysticism" by G. William Barnard in the last issue of AntiMatters (http://anti-matters.org/07). Those with little time should at least read the passages marked by sidebars. Reply

March 15, 2009

Sri Aurobindo's philosophy of a new and higher consciousness

THE SPEAKING TREE Evolutionary Ideas Of Aurobindo
TOI, 10 Sep 2004, 0000 hrs IST, Kishore Gandhi

Sri Aurobindo's insight and analysis of evolution are now part of the scientific and cultural landscape. But few scientists and artists know his evolutionary theories that are being proved true by modern science. While probing frontiers of science, physicists have discovered the limitation of the Newtonian mechanistic model at the level of galaxies and electrons. These discoveries have no doubt given the first glimmering of the new paradigm that matter and consciousness are the primary forces in the universe.

The theory of relativity and quantum mechanics, Heisenberg's principles of uncertainty, Bohr's laws, Schrodinger's resolution of particle/wave paradox, Prigogine's discovery of dissipative structures based on self-organising and self-transcendent systems, Roger Sperry's researches in the right and left implications of hemispheric brain processes, Ervin Laszlo's Psi hypothesis have all brought about major breakthroughs that have profound philosophical implications for science as a whole. This development marked a major shift from the clockwork paradigm to an uncertainty paradigm, from the absolute to the relative. The new model looks upon matter as being in some way a graded manifestation of consciousness. So increasingly, the West has been showing an increasing interest in Eastern thought, particularly in Buddhism and Vedanta.

The Isa Upanishad says, "Everything that exists in the cosmos, living or non-living, is the habitation of the divine". The Mundaka Upanishad says that one perceives "Brahmn verily in this resplendent cosmos, in front and behind, above and below, in the right and to the left. The universe is indeed all manifestation of the Brahmn". These mystical insights are being significantly recognised by physicists as a more accurate expression of the real structure of the universe than many of the classical theories of science. The dance of Shiva is inspiring physicists as a new reference point in explaining the creation of this world in terms of a unified field theory.

The double crises of civilisation and evolution today is the product of the human mind. I see through the eye, not with it, said William Blake. He also said that "if the doors of perception were cleansed, we would see the world as it is, infinite". Quite clearly, the human mind which imagines, reasons and creates is dynamically active, and is playing a critical role in the process of its own evolution and also in the survival and evolution of all living things. The future of our evolutionary course will be in the realm of psychic deve-lopment, and the new potentialities will make us surpass ourselves. The development of transdisciplinary approaches to knowledge corresponding to the creative manifestations of life is our model for tomorrow.

Aurobindo's philosophy of a new and higher consciousness for the future provides a convincing and viable alternative to a bewildered humanity that is living under the spell of multiple fears. The discoveries of modern science have no doubt given their own verdict of opposing alternatives — of either the Buddha or the bomb, for instance — and it is up to each one of us to decide which path to follow. To save history from being reduced to a tragedy of successive civilisations, we need to promote the Oneness Principle. Global consciousness is the only way out. [Sri Aurobindo: Evolutionary Ideas Of Sri Aurobindo] [Daily Excelsior... Editorial]

Immaterial production has more similarities to the pre-industrial capitalism

Communism conference — Michael Hardt
from The Pinocchio Theory by Steven Shaviro [Hardt didn't mention this, but his periodization fits in well with McKenzie Wark's idea of a movement from landlords to industrialists to the current "vectorial class" of the owners of property rights to "information." Hardt, like Wark, is focused on what Wark calls "the property question"].

Today, informatic or immaterial production is focused on questions of so-called “intellectual property” (this is my term, not Hardt’s), in the forms of copyright, patents, etc. A company’s physical products often have value, not because of any actual use, but because they are manifestations of a “brand” to which consumers are attracted, or with which they identify. Massive sums of money are gained from things like patents on genetic sequences, genetically modified crops, rights to copyrights on music, video, and text, to (often frivolous) patents on supposed inventions, to control of certain channels of distribution, to a company’s working methods and “trade secrets,” and so on. Even traditional hard-manufacture factories are governed by informatics, and profit comes as much or more from control of the informational organization that governs production, than from the physical items in themselves that are produced (as these latter are not sold for much above cost).

According to Hardt, all this means that immaterial production has more similarities to the pre-industrial capitalism focused on the extraction of rent than it does to the (pre-informatic, or perhaps Fordist) industrial system that focused on the extraction of surplus value as profit. The most dynamic sort of capitalist appropriation today comes in the form of a renewed “primitive accumulation,” or privatization of the common: one can see how both the patenting of genetic sequences taken from plants used by traditional cultures, and the copyrighting of “new” ideas and their expression, fits into this paradigm. This means that the struggle against capitalism must take on radically different forms, compared to those of the 19th and early 20th centuries. According to Hardt, immaterial production qua primitive accumulation is more a case of the direct appropriation of the common by capitalists, than it is one of the indirect expropriation of the common through the sale and purchase of labor power as was the case under industrial capitalism. [Libertarians and Marxists agree on fictive finance at 12:41 PM] [Digital technologies bring with them new forms of control & micromanagement at 1:33 PM]

March 12, 2009

Nietzsche admires and envies Socrates as the "midwife" of the soul

On Sagehood and the Love of Wisdom from Gaia Community: kelamuni's Blog

Socrates assumes a number of guises. He partakes of the Greek ideals of rational discourse and intellectual "combat", but "rationalism" is not his teaching, as the moderns think. His "teaching", in fact, is rather odd. He seems to have no teaching at all and appears only to engage in enquiry. Aristotle notes, "Socrates used to ask questions and not answer them, for he used to confess that he did not know". At the same time Socrates refused to be called a master of wisdom. Epictetus says of him, "When people used to come and see him, they asked him to introduce them to lovers of wisdom; he readily complied, and at the same time willingly accepted to pass unnoticed himself." Pierre Hadot writes, "Since he had nothing to say, and no thesis to defend, all Socrates could do is ask questions, even though he himself refused to answer them." One is reminded here of Nagarjuna's paradoxical utterance in his Vigrahavyavatani: "I have no thesis (pratijna) to defend".

When we look at the "Socratic" Dialogues with this interpretive key, and consider them as literary works, we can see that "Socrates" is not so much interested in teaching a "theory of ideas", or what the "real" definition of justice is. He is actually only interested in his interlocutors. In the Apology he confesses that it has, all along, only ever been about teaching what each of his interlocutors "is". In the Dialogues, the enquiry winds about, comes to an impasse, Socrates takes it over, and then it all comes to a puzzling end, at which point both we and the interlocutor are not clear as to what it is we have learnt. But the pattern is always this: Socrates questions someone who thinks they know what they are talking about, and by the end of the interrogation it becomes quite clear that they don't know what they are talking about. The "teaching" here is simply that one should understand the limits of his knowledge and the limitations of his noetic capacities.

This same Socratic theme of knowing one's limitations reappears in the works of Kierkegaard, and here we find the other dominant "figure" in the West: that of Jesus. Here, the issue becomes not so much whether or not Kierkegaard's contemporaries are sages, but the degree to which they can be called "Christians". Kierkegaard sets an almost impossible standard here; indeed in his version of the "imitation of Christ" the only true Christian can be Christ himself. Just as Socrates finds no true sages among his peers, Kierkegaard finds no true "Christians".

We might say that for the ancients, the image of the "sage" functions entirely as a kind of "transcendent norm". Sage-hood lies beyond the grasp of the mere mortal, but it is something that should be striven after nonetheless. While sage-hood functions as a kind of transcendent norm that can only ever be approached asymptotically, the practical paradigm becomes that of the lover of wisdom, represented by the figure of Socrates (and other figures such as Pyrrho, Diogenes, Epicurus, and so on). Two of the characteristic features of this general teaching of the ancients can be said to be the teaching that the lover of wisdom is a composite of both wisdom/knowledge and folly/ignorance, and that the lover of wisdom unceasingly engages in enquiry (zetesis; skepsis).

According to Nietzsche, there are two sides to Socrates the teacher. One is the seducer of youths who rips the masks from the gods, dissolves their myths, and replaces them with the "knowledge of good and evil". As Hadot points out, this is the Socrates that Nietzsche despises, because this was what Nietzsche himself was so good at. The other is Socrates as the "midwife" of the soul, the Socrates who teaches his students to "care for their self". This is the Socrates that Nietzsche admires and envies, because he found this capacity to be so lacking in himself.

Hadot points out that the teacher as "midwife" does not so much engender the soul of the student as allow the student to engender his own soul. Somewhat paradoxically, the teacher teaches by becoming a kind of student himself. Kierkegaard writes, "The student is an opportunity for the teacher to understand himself, just as the teacher is an opportunity for the student to understand himself." Here, teaching, paedeia, becomes a kind of "spiritual exercise" in itself, and its paradigm of the teacher who remains the perennial student becomes an expression of the ideal of unceasing enquiry.

March 11, 2009

Butterfly Dream, Techno-Scopophilia, and Supersubstantivalism

Home Go to Routledge.com Books Book Search New Titles Forthcoming Titles Introductory Philosophy
Routledge.com New Philosophy Journal Articles: these journal articles are all hosted on informaworld™, our online database of journals, eBooks, abstract databases and reference works from Routledge and the Taylor & Francis Group.

Toward a Theory of Progressive Evolution (Large-Scale Stages of Evolutionary Progress)
World Futures. Vol. 65, No. 3, pp. 145–165. Zaltsman, Henry L..
A Transdisciplinary Perspective Concerning the Origin of the Species: The Migratory Theory of Genetic Fitness
World Futures. Vol. 65, No. 3, pp. 166–175. Montoya, C. P.; Montoya, N. L.; Peck, D. A.; Montoya, D. E..
An Evolutionary Approach to Revising Modernization Theory: An Introduction to the Credible Polity
World Futures. Vol. 65, No. 3, pp. 176–203. Goorha, Prateek.
The Nature of Evolution
World Futures. Vol. 65, No. 3, pp. 204–221. Laszlo, Alexander.
A Review of “The Science of Leonardo: Inside the Mind of the Great Genius of the Renaissance by Fritjof Capra”
World Futures. Vol. 65, No. 3, pp. 222–223. Abraham, Ralph.
All's Fair in Love and Sport: Black Masculinity and Domestic Violence in the News
Communication and Critical/Cultural Studies. Vol. 6, No. 1, pp. 1–18. Enck-Wanzer, Suzanne Marie.
The Rhetoric of Nuclear Colonialism: Rhetorical Exclusion of American Indian Arguments in the Yucca Mountain Nuclear Waste Siting Decision
Communication and Critical/Cultural Studies. Vol. 6, No. 1, pp. 39–60. Endres, Danielle.
Introduction
Communication and Critical/Cultural Studies. Vol. 6, No. 1, pp. 84–85. Biesecker, Barbara A..
“Sweetheart, This Ain't Gender Studies”: Sexism and Superheroes
Communication and Critical/Cultural Studies. Vol. 6, No. 1, pp. 86–92. Stabile, Carol A..
Supermarginal
Communication and Critical/Cultural Studies. Vol. 6, No. 1, pp. 98–102. Shugart, Helene.
How America Learned to Stop Worrying and Cynically ENJOY! The Post-9/11 Superhero Zeitgeist
Communication and Critical/Cultural Studies. Vol. 6, No. 1, pp. 103–109. Treat, Shaun.
Physician-Assisted Death in the Pacific Northwest
The American Journal of Bioethics. Vol. 9, No. 3, pp. 1–2. Jecker, Nancy S..
Agency and Responsibility in Health Care Worker Migration
The American Journal of Bioethics. Vol. 9, No. 3, pp. 8–9. Crozier, G. K. D..
Justice and the Reversal of the Healthcare Worker 'Brain-Drain'
The American Journal of Bioethics. Vol. 9, No. 3, pp. 10–12. List, Justin M..
Are Healthcare Workers Chained to Their Country of Origin?
The American Journal of Bioethics. Vol. 9, No. 3, pp. 16–18. Zivotofsky, Naomi; Zivotofsky, Ari Z..
Oregon's Experience: Evaluating the Record
The American Journal of Bioethics. Vol. 9, No. 3, pp. 19–27. Lindsay, Ronald A..
Physician-Assisted Dying—What Would Aristotle Do?
The American Journal of Bioethics. Vol. 9, No. 3, pp. 30–31. Duffy, James.
Why Involve Physicians in Assisted Suicide?
The American Journal of Bioethics. Vol. 9, No. 3, pp. 32–34. Paris, John J..
What is the Best Standard for the Standard of Care in Clinical Research?
The American Journal of Bioethics. Vol. 9, No. 3, pp. 35–43. van Delden, Johannes J. M.; van der Graaf, Rieke.
Standard-of-Care Propositions Should Permit Informative Comparisons
The American Journal of Bioethics. Vol. 9, No. 3, pp. 46–47. Mann, Howard.
The Bridge
The American Journal of Bioethics. Vol. 9, No. 3, pp. 51–53. Jones, Therese.
Response to Open Peer Commentaries on “Is Health Worker Migration a Case of Poaching?”
The American Journal of Bioethics. Vol. 9, No. 3, pp. W1–W2. Snyder, Jeremy.
Autonomy under threat: a revised Frankfurtian account
Philosophical Explorations. Vol. 12, No. 1, pp. 3–17. Nys, Thomas.
The trouble with prudence
Philosophical Explorations. Vol. 12, No. 1, pp. 19–40. Laden, Anthony Simon.
Alternative motivation: a new challenge to moral judgment internalism
Philosophical Explorations. Vol. 12, No. 1, pp. 41–53. Sneddon, Andrew.
Humean agent-neutral reasons?
Philosophical Explorations. Vol. 12, No. 1, pp. 55–67. Evers, Daan.
Interpreting the Butterfly Dream
Asian Philosophy. Vol. 19, No. 1, pp. 1–9. Han, Xiaoqiang.
Making Sense of Sorai: How to Deal with the Contradictions in Ogyu Sorai's Political Theory
Asian Philosophy. Vol. 19, No. 1, pp. 11–30. Ansart, Olivier.
Li in East Asian Buddhism: One Approach from Plato's Parmenides
Asian Philosophy. Vol. 19, No. 1, pp. 31–49. Behuniak, James.
Dynamic and Syncretic Dimensions to Santarak?ita's Presentation of the Two Truths
Asian Philosophy. Vol. 19, No. 1, pp. 51–62. Blumenthal, James.
Contaminants and the Path to Salvation: A Study of the Sarvastivada H?daya Treatises
Asian Philosophy. Vol. 19, No. 1, pp. 63–84. Dessein, Bart.
The Price of Serving Meat—On Confucius's and Mencius's Views of Human and Animal Rights
Asian Philosophy. Vol. 19, No. 1, pp. 85–99. Bai, Tongdong.
“You Talkin' To Me?” Mediating Postmodern Blackface in La Haine
Critical Studies in Media Communication. Vol. 26, No. 1, pp. 1–18. Moscowitz, David.
Techno-Scopophilia: The Semiotics of Technological Pleasure in Film
Critical Studies in Media Communication. Vol. 26, No. 1, pp. 19–35. Soukup, Charles.
Domestic Divo? Televised Treatments of Masculinity, Femininity and Food
Critical Studies in Media Communication. Vol. 26, No. 1, pp. 36–53. Swenson, Rebecca.
Burning Mississippi into Memory? Cinematic Amnesia as a Resource for Remembering Civil Rights
Critical Studies in Media Communication. Vol. 26, No. 1, pp. 54–79. Hoerl, Kristen.
Straightening Out (the Politics of) Same-Sex Parenting: Representing Gay Families in US Print News Stories and Photographs
Critical Studies in Media Communication. Vol. 26, No. 1, pp. 80–100. Landau, Jamie.
Getting IT Across
Australasian Journal of Philosophy. Vol. 87, No. 1, pp. 1–3. Saunders, Alan.
Universalism, Vagueness and Supersubstantivalism
Australasian Journal of Philosophy. Vol. 87, No. 1, pp. 35–42. Effingham, Nikk.
Actions, thought-experiments and the 'Principle of alternate possibilities'
Australasian Journal of Philosophy. Vol. 87, No. 1, pp. 61–81. Alvarez, Maria.
Emergentism and supervenience physicalism
Australasian Journal of Philosophy. Vol. 87, No. 1, pp. 83–98. Howell, Robert J..
Senses for senses
Australasian Journal of Philosophy. Vol. 87, No. 1, pp. 99–117. Thompson, Brad.
The return of Taylor's Putnam
Australasian Journal of Philosophy. Vol. 87, No. 1, pp. 119–125. Kovach, Adam.
Trogdon on Monism and Intrinsicality
Australasian Journal of Philosophy. Vol. 87, No. 1, pp. 149–154. Skiles, Alexander.
In Defence of 'Partially Clad' Bare Particulars
Australasian Journal of Philosophy. Vol. 87, No. 1, pp. 155–158. Pickavance, Timothy.
Analytical Buddhism: The Two-Tiered Illusion of Self
Australasian Journal of Philosophy. Vol. 87, No. 1, pp. 159–162. Goodman, Charles.
Logical Pluralism
Australasian Journal of Philosophy. Vol. 87, No. 1, pp. 162–168. Humberstone, Lloyd.
Intending the World: A Phenomenology of International Affairs
Australasian Journal of Philosophy. Vol. 87, No. 1, pp. 174–175. van Hooft, Stan.
Patriotism: Philosophical and Political Perspectives
Australasian Journal of Philosophy. Vol. 87, No. 1, pp. 175–176. Formosa, Paul.
C. B. Martin
Australasian Journal of Philosophy. Vol. 87, No. 1, pp. 177–179. Heil, John. see more new articles…

March 10, 2009

Elements of a Psychology of Evolution

"Elements of a Psychology of Evolution" a talk by Thomas Dreyer ::: Unity Pavilion ::: Thu ::: 5:00 PM

Thomas Dreyer, of AVI-Germany, will present a talk on "Elements of a Psychology of Evolution" at Unity Pavilion, Thursday, March 12, at 5.00 PM
These elements of a Psychology of Evolution -- based on Sri Aurobindo's and Mothers writings on the topic -- were developed in context of a number of studies related to the overall theme of evolution, as a study on European history ranging from neolithic revolution to present time. posted by bhavana

University of Human Unity Seminar in Psychology of Social Development
Unity Pavilion ::: 9:30 AM

The Ever-Present Origin of Jean Gebser. The Mythical Structure of Consciousness (Power Point and discussion), by Vladimir.
All are welcome. posted by vladimir

Architecture students should ultimately study philosophy

WA Main / Theory and Issues / Critical Regionalism POLITICS, PHILOSOPHY, CRITICAL THEORY, AND HUMAN PERCEPTION.
By Nikos A. Salingaros & Kenneth G. Masden II.
Section of the longer paper "Intelligence-Based Design: A Sustainable Foundation
for Worldwide Architectural Education", ArchNet-IJAR: International Journal of
Architectural Research, Volume 2, Issue 1 (March 2008), pages 129-188. Reprinted
in two parts with comments in Archiwatch (February 2009).

The way philosophy is currently taught to architects tends to mix political ideology with idiosyncratic and subjective insights into society, and this muddled mess is presented as a theoretical basis for architectural and urban design. This practice is a terribly dangerous mix, as it gives students a perverted and erroneous, if not fraudulent basis for their profession. [...] Even though the majority of architecture professors are not overtly political, and even less declared Marxists, architecture schools have been dominated by a philosophy that arose from the radical political left. Critical theory and its architectural derivatives (which represent ideology rather than theory) continue to dictate architectural texts. [..]
Critical Theory has had its most insidious effect on architecture with the spread of the doctrine known as "Critical Regionalism". Proponents of this self-contradictory ideology assert that vernacular tradition and culture are dead, and that henceforth, regional architecture must adapt to modernist uniformization. They proclaim that the patterns and practices from which a region’s identity is derived are mere "nostalgia", and instead recommend the abstract aesthetics of international modernism (Cassidy, 2007). Any architectural expression, other than those possible within the restricted modernist aesthetic, is rejected. Those writers’ avowed intention is to create forms that do not belong to the vernacular form language. What results from this schizophrenic approach is not regional architecture in any sense, but a set of self-referential objects detached from their cultural roots, created and manipulated without regard to their regional context. (One occasionally sees an attempt at site-specific climatic adaptation, but nothing more).
Teachers thus use purely ideological arguments to validate a narrow set of design styles for students. That is as wrong as it is unsupported. It is only a means to further sustain a cult ideology that has dominated architectural education for the past several decades. The point is that good architecture and urbanism have nothing to do with political beliefs.
Worst of all, teachers apply techniques learned from political ideologues to coerce students and other academics into intellectual submission. Such forms of censorship are typical of a system that considers itself above all others. It gives itself the authority to reframe every member’s worldview. Whenever evidence is ignored, and is substituted by the irrational, that creates dogma. This erroneous style of teaching has become solidly established in today’s system.
One way to maintain the mystique of "architecture as an art" was to embrace ever more abstruse and incomprehensible texts, so as to shield the discipline’s shaky intellectual core from outside scrutiny. This obsession (or defensive tactic) has led architecture to embrace the nihilistic and deconstructive philosophers. Having architecture students read Derridean and Deleuzean philosophical texts disorients them, breaking down their critical faculties. Such disorientation could in fact be deliberate: a necessary psychological preparation for imprinting stylistic preferences in their minds (Salingaros, 2004).
Throwing the burden of teaching architects onto obscure philosophical texts enables architecture schools to endorse a very narrow set of design styles, embracing those currently in fashion.
The common justification given for studying philosophy is that architecture and urbanism are intimately tied to social phenomena, so that philosophy prepares a student to confront architectural problems. This explanation is a subterfuge, however, operating more as a means to avoid teaching architecture to students directly. The modernist teaching method, wherein all useful derived knowledge is thrown out in the tabula rasa approach, cannot openly admit that architectural and urban knowledge ever existed. If it did, then someone would have to explain how over 2,000 years of knowledge was lost, discarded, or ignored during the modernists’ 70-year reign. By diverting architecture students towards carefully selected philosophical authors, this action conveniently covers up the deliberate avoidance of any genuine, newly-derived or historically-relevant architectural theory.
So much of what now passes for "architectural theory" is therefore little more than doctrine. It conditions students to have absolute faith in a body of beliefs established in the absence of real-world criteria. Those beliefs set up the student’s worldview as shaped by the dynamics of in-group affiliation: a cognitive filter that bends information to fit, and rejects information that does not fit. Architectural education must in the future clearly separate architecture from politics, and also separate architecture from self-referential philosophy. Only teachers can train their students to do this. Both teachers and students can achieve this clarity of thought only after they understand the genuine theoretical basis of architecture, expressed in strictly architectural terms. Schools have a responsibility to teach a genuinely architectural basis for design.
Architecture students should ultimately study philosophy, but that is productive once they have formed a basis of what is really going on in architecture. And the philosophy they study has to be positive and humanistic. Many philosophers throughout history emphasize the necessity for human beings to connect to the universe, but architects hardly ever study those authors. Intelligence-Based Design has deep philosophical foundations. Humanly-adaptive architecture and urbanism arise out of a respect for humanity’s higher meaning in an infinite universe. There exists a vast body of philosophical work connecting humanity both with nature and with the sublime. One of our recommended texts, The Luminous Ground (Alexander, 2004) establishes a genuine philosophical foundation for an adaptive architecture.
  • Philosophers whose writings are essential for the sustainability of humankind try to understand otherwise puzzling human actions outside a strictly scientific framework.
  • They help us to delineate good from bad in human activities. This historical notion of "morality" recurs throughout the traditional treatises on philosophy of the entire world.
  • Numerous contemporary philosophers celebrate life and the sacredness of humanity.
  • Traditional religious texts are founded upon morality stories that help humanity to see beyond the limitations of human beings existing as animals or purely subjective beings.

But none of this is ever incorporated into architectural teaching today — which still turns to the same peculiar handful of (Western) philosophers, relying upon them to justify "architecture for architecture’s sake". Judging by how inhuman its forms are, the driving ideology is purely nihilistic, even as it serves global capital.

The separation between nihilism and humanism is total and uncompromising, however.
We have to choose very carefully which philosophers, and which texts to offer students for their reading assignments. A school cannot abrogate its responsibility by teaching architecture as a set of self-serving beliefs. In the twentieth century, architecture became a mass movement under the influence of leading architects who exploited specific philosophical texts to support their ideals and to promote themselves (Salingaros, 2004).
Architecture detached itself from any higher order in human existence, turning away from both nature and from the sacred. It was the first time in human history that humans began to intentionally create unnatural structures that are uncomfortable to inhabit and to experience.
Complexity and contradiction in urban India « VOICE OF WORDS At a more utopian level, the town of Auroville in south India has been a mystical answer to the question of Indian architecture. Posing as a city that welcomes all, Auroville has a master plan that resembles a revolving galaxy, ...By ahssan VOICE OF WORDS. 3:34 PM 3:57 PM

March 09, 2009

Ancient Greek and Roman worlds

Jan 29, 2009 Greek and Roman Networks in the Mediterranean
from Routledge History Arena - New Titles
Greek and Roman Networks in the Mediterranean
Edited by Irad Malkin, Christy Constantakopoulou, Katerina Panagopoulou

How useful is the concept of "network" for historical studies and the ancient world in particular? Using theoretical models of social network analysis, this book illuminates aspects of the economic, social, religious, and political history of the ancient Greek and Roman worlds.

Bringing together some of the most active and prominent researchers in ancient history, this book moves beyond political institutions, ethnic, and geographical boundaries in order to observe the ancient Mediterranean through a perspective of network interaction. It employs a wide range of approaches, and to examine relationships and interactions among various social entities in the Mediterranean. Chronologically, the book extends from the early Iron Age to the late Antique world, covering the Mediterranean between Antioch in the east to Massalia (Marseilles) in the west.

This book was published as two special issues in Mediterranean Historical Review.
ISBN: 9780415459891 Published January 29 2009 by Routledge.

Today the Auroville Library is online

Home > Journals & Media > Journals > Auroville Today > Current issue > Auroville library
A library in crisis - Priya Sundaravalli
The Auroville Library urgently needs a new building

Jürgen himself is not trained in the library sciences – he studied philosophy. “I learnt along the way, and I am still learning.” When Jürgen first came to Pondicherry , he was assigned the task of managing the little Auroville library then located in Pondicherry overlooking the beach. “That was for a short time,” he says, “but it was the first thing I was called to do.” Later he moved on to other things. Eleven years ago, when Lloyd decided to stop working at the Library, Jürgen took over.

In some ways, Jürgen reminds one of a character from one of the books on his shelves, a philosopher-scholar-pioneer-librarian all rolled into one – quirky and sentimental when it comes to books, gruff and grumpy with patrons who break the unwritten codes of library etiquette but quickly forgiving too, and tech-savvy, unafraid to embrace the developments of 21st century library science. But managing and running the Library, he confesses, has been an uphill battle.

For over three years, he has been working to get a new site and building plans approved. “We found a location opposite the Solar Kitchen in what is called the city centre area. It would also house the existing audio and video libraries.” He explains that Roger Anger had approved the building site before he passed away and L'Avenir d'Auroville also gave its support. But the project got stalled for lack of funds. At the moment Jürgen, with the help of architect Suhasini, has resubmitted a revised and scaled-down proposal.

Jürgen has a grand vision of uniting the different libraries in Auroville under one virtual platform. In 2005, he initiated the ‘All Auroville Library Project'. Its goal was to create an electronic database, linking all the libraries' databases, and to make this accessible from any location via the intranet. The idea found support from Stichting de Zaaier but the project could not fully manifest as not all the Auroville libraries wanted to participate. “The reason given was lack of manpower,” says Jürgen. Yet he went ahead and demonstrated the viability of the idea using an open source software, NewGen Lib. Today the Auroville Library is online. Registered patrons can renew books electronically, place reservations, or even download e-books from this site. The Library's catalogueing and readers registration systems are now state-of-the-art.

Jürgen has managed the near-impossible, with an insufficient budget, a derelict building, lack of infrastructure and unqualified staff. The Auroville Library now needs a better building. Urgently.

March 08, 2009

The virtues of life are comparable to the virtues of good writing – connectedness, grace, elegance

Things I've been reading recently: Lombardo, Nehamas, and Paglia
from The Middle Stage by Chandrahas
Some very fine things I've been reading recently (I recommend a cup of a good brew and at least an hour of free time for the proper reception of each of these sections):

An interview with Stanley Lombardo, one of the most recent flagholders of a venerable tradition, that of translating Homer's Odyssey into English ("The word Muse in Greek means ‘mind’ originally...Mind is for me the essence of translation. Odysseus has to attain the minds of many people in his wanderings. That’s what Homer has done, and it’s why his characters are so real — he attains the human mind, he attains many human minds. Translation is mind to mind, not dictionary to dictionary. Homer is a mind that I try to attain."). Chapter One of Lombardo's translation of the Odyssey is here, and if you'd like to hear a recording of him reading from the same section it is here. A friend recently bought me Lombardo's translation from the US (it is published by a small but very good publisher of classics, Hackett), and I've been trying to read it against the widely available Penguin translation by Robert Fagles.

An interview with the classics scholar Alexander Nehamas about Socrates, Nietzsche, Foucault, and also the relationship between book-learning and living in the world ("In modern times philosophy has traditionally been taken to be in the broadest sense a scientific discipline.... But in ancient Greece, as well as in a modest modern tradition, the primary issue is not to find answers to particular philosophical questions like "What is knowledge?" or "What is reality?" or "What is good?" The primary issue is to live a philosophic life. To be a philosopher is to be a certain kind of person, not simply to have views on certain issues. A philosopher who is a certain kind of person is also, of course, a person who has views on philosophical issues. But what matters is not just the answers such a person gives. What matters is the kind of connections you establish between various philosophical issues and the rest of your life. What matters is that a personality emerges who has asked certain kinds of questions and given certain kinds of answers to them, and who, most importantly, has constructed a life around such questions and answers...I am trying to reclaim the defining tradition of Greek philosophy, philosophy as techne tou biou – the art of living. Though 'art' is not a particularly accurate translation of the Greek techne, which is not art in the sense of our 'fine art', but something between art and craft.") I was also intrigued by Nehamas's idea that "the features that characterize oneself and one's life are similar to the features of literary works. The virtues of life are comparable to the virtues of good writing – connectedness, grace, elegance." If you enjoy this, you might also want to read "Plato or Schopenhauer", the opening chapter of Nehamas's book The Place of Beauty in a World of Art.

An interview with the iconoclastic classics and poetry scholar Camille Paglia by Michael Sragow (himself the author of a recent biography of the American film director Victor Fleming) on the subject of the films of Alfred Hitchcock ("In writing my study of 'The Birds' for the British Film Institute, I had the opportunity to review all kinds of films from Hitchcock's past that were not available when I was young -- films from the silent era and the 1930s that are now on video. I was just stunned by what I discovered: the blatant continuity of Hitchcock's sensibility, down to tiny little details in the earliest films in matters of decor or geographical setting or the plot. It's clear that what we have in the works of Hitchcock really is, despite the ups and downs of the quality of the films, a giant oeuvre – one huge imaginative projection.") You might also enjoy Paglia's essay "The Mighty River of Classics", and "Rhyme and Reason", the introduction to her 2005 anthology Break, Blow, Burn, a set of readings of 43 of her favourite poems ("My secular but semi-mystical view of art is that it taps primal energies, breaks down barriers and imperiously remakes our settled way of seeing. Animated by the breath force (the original meaning of 'spirit' and 'inspiration'), poetry brings exhilarating spiritual renewal....Like philosophy, poetry is a contemplative form, but unlike philosophy, poetry subliminally manipulates the body and triggers its nerve impulses, the muscle tremors of sensation and speech"). Paglia describes the selection process for the anthology here.

Some of these pieces were published many years ago, and discovering them brings home how, on the Internet, as in a library, everything remains "current" in such a good way.

March 03, 2009

What I want to avoid is some mystical hypothesis that the whole is more than the sum of its parts

larvalsubjects Says: March 3, 2009 at 2:05 am Hi Anondynelite,
Perhaps you could say a bit as to why you don’t see Deleuze as a realist.

I suppose the first reason I read Deleuze as a realist has to do with the logic of his account of individuation and actualization. Where the anti-realist or correlationist argues that objects conform to mind such that we cannot know objects as they are in-themselves, thereby restricting our relationship to the epistemological, Deleuze’s claims about individuation or actualization are ontological in character. From his very early works all the way to his final published work, Deleuze is very careful to emphasize that the transcendental field is not immanent to consciousness or, for that matter, anything, but is rather immanent to itself. Moreover, he compares the transcendental field to Spinoza’s immanent being or substance. The transcendental field is thus not something that belongs to a subject, rather, as Deleuze repeatedly emphasizes, rather subjects and objects are individuated out of the transcendental field (and not, under my reading, necessarily together).

Second, Deleuze constantly give examples from ontological domains outside of the subject: physical multiplicities, biological multiplicities, etc. In my reading, Deleuze is not making claims about these beings for mind but in themselves. This reading is further supported by Simondon from whom he draws heavily, where individuation is a question of beings themselves, not for us. Consequently, in my view Deleuze is unique among the thinkers of ‘68 in being the only genuine realist or the only philosopher that doesn’t shackle beings to a transcendental subject, language, the social, etc.

larvalsubjects Says: March 3, 2009 at 2:58 am Kvond,
I agree with you vis a vis Whitehead’s terminology. You might, however, find Science and the Modern World avoids this problem (Process and Reality is a mess, though rewarding and highly suggestive if you can stomach its language).

With respect to my hesitations in treating Green as an object, my intuitions are two-fold. First, my hunch is that in order for something to count as an object it must be capable of independent existence. I’m willing to hold that a cell is an independent object despite existing in a body because a cell can at least potentially exist independently of the other cells to which it is related. Properties like green just don’t strike me as having this sort of nature. In Spinoza’s language they strike me as affections of substances rather than as substances in their own right. In response to this one might argue by arguing that

“sure, instantiations of Green only exist as predicates of substances, but Green is not itself an affection, but an individual existing in its own right as an eternal and enduring object.”

Here the question for me becomes what ontological advantage lies in granting Green substantial existence in this way? The ontological disadvantages are, I think, pretty clear. We get all of the problems of participation that haunted Plato’s metaphysics. The advantage is that it allows us to account for why reality has a particular structure in all instantiations of this universal (here my realism about universals would tend more in the direction of mathematical relationships rather than things like Green).

However, if there is a way of avoiding the affirmation of these strange ontological entities, I would prefer that route being taken rather than asserting this sort of Platonic realism about universals. Again, I have not decided where I shake down on this issue. I do not like constructivist theories of mathematics as my hunch or intuition is that there is something real, mind independent, and ontologically deep about mathematics. I find it remarkable that the world seems to have the same mathematical structure in many instances that we are able to discover through thought alone. This leads me to believe that there is something about being and objects that is itself mathematical. Does this sense lead me to Platonism where mathematical entities are concerned, though?

larvalsubjects Says: March 3, 2009 at 4:15 am Nick,
it seems then that the issue comes down (and this has been mentioned in a number of places on the blogosphere) to emergence. What is it? Does it exist? Is it ontological or merely a remnant of our particular epistemological perspective?

No disagreement here. I’d like to be able to claim both that emergence is ontologically real and that unique patterns of order irreducible to their lower levels result in this emergence. What I want to avoid is some mystical hypothesis that the whole is more than the sum of its parts. Bhaskar has some good things to say about this relationship. I’ll try to dig them up this week if I get some spare time as I think they are highly relevant to this discussion and avoid falling into this trap.

Mullah Sadra, Simone Weil, Jacques Maritain, & Abhinavagupta

2009-02-25 Islamic Existentialism
College students today are taught that existentialism is an ideology created in the West, in the twentieth century. This is false, and betrays the Academy's general ignorance of all things non-Western (certainly there are specialized fields of studies, though that doesn't change the fact that in traditional departments (philosophy, history,...) all things from the East are relegated - if at all - to a footnote (a footnote oftentimes belittling, offensive, and smacking of orientalism). Even the Western origins of existentialism, in the thought of Aquinas, are largely ignored, due to the current prejudices against any modes of thought, which emphasize faith and belief.

Existentialism is not synonymous with Sartre and Heidegger. Existentialism is simply a philosophical ontology, which emphasizes existence over essence; becoming / be-ing over being. There have been Christian, Muslim, and Hindu Existentialists; all far prior to the twentieth century! With traditional existentialism, it is a matter of emphasis, not exaggeration. Be-ing, may be emphasized over being, though there is a place for being, and there is not rejection of a Being (Truth, Reality, the Divine, the Sacred, etc.). Perhaps you wonder now if the author is perhaps the mistress of obfuscation; no, not at all; it is really quite simple, if you think about it for a bit!

Islamic existentialism is attributed to Mullah Sadra. In fact, one could say his main advancement (if, that is you agree with his theses) over Suhrawardi, was his emphasis on existence as such. Unfortunately, there is far too little of the primary source material available for readers of English. James Morris' "Wisdom of the Throne", and Christian Jambet's "The Act of Being" are excellent, though necessarily limited. Hitherto, no - even partial - translation into English of his major work, al-Asfar, has come into being. Don't fret!

For one who has an insatiable appetite for all things Sadra, there are options. Though you would not be reading the man, himself, you can get a good idea of his more advanced perspectives through the readings of other religious existentialists (I refer, not to the likes of Marcel, who are thoroughly modern). I suggest the writings of Simone Weil; Jacques Maritain; and the Kashmir Shaivites, such as Abhinavagupta. These will give you a good taste for the doctrine of Sadra; out of the Islamic tradition, as they may be. Or on the other hand, in the true existentialist spirit, travel to Qom and soak up the atmosphere. While there, pray before God as if you were Her sole vice regent upon this Earth, standing alone, with humanity's fate upon your shoulders; then you will understand Sadra and Islamic existentialism. Situated in Hyperreality by Farasha Euker at 18:07 0 comments

Spiritual Physics

AntiMatters Vol 3 No 1 (2009) Released
by koantum on Mon 02 Mar 2009 08:59 PM PST Permanent Link
Vol 3 No 1 (2009)
Table of Contents Introducing the 7th Issue PDF

To Darwin: A Birthday Manifesto David Loye PDF
Transformations and Transformers: Spirituality and the Academic Study of Mysticism G. William Barnard PDF
The Forgotten September 11 and the Clasp of Civilizations Richard Hartz PDF
Untold Potentialities: India and the World in the Third Millennium Richard Hartz PDF
Spiritual Physics Ulrich Mohrhoff PDF
An Aurobindonian Discourse Ulrich Mohrhoff PDF
Review of Berlinski: The Devil’s Delusion – Atheism and Its Scientific Pretensions PDF
Review of McIntosh: Integral Consciousness and the Future of Evolution – How the Integral Worldview is Transforming Politics, Culture and Spirituality PDF
Review of Heehs: The Lives of Sri Aurobindo Marcel Kvassay PDF
Chapter 2 of Yoga, Karma, and Rebirth – A Brief History and Philosophy Stephen Phillips PDF
Subject and Object (Chapter 8 of Nature and Self: Reframing the Human Predicament) Mait Edey PDF
The Rainbow Bridge of the Gods (in When the Impossible Happens: Adventures in Non-Ordinary Reality) Stanislav Grof PDF
When Science Becomes Scientism: Carl Sagan and His Demon-Haunted World (in When the Impossible Happens) Stanislav Grof PDF
The Ideal of Human Unity (Excerpts) Sri Aurobindo PDF Posted to: Main Page

February 27, 2009

The "supreme" vak is associated with the root cakra, muladhara

The Question of the Status of the World in Advaita Vedanta
from Gaia Community: kelamuni's Blog

For the most part, Shankara tows the party line of the Vedanta: the world has brahman as its cause. But he also says that the world arises out of what he calls "unmanifest name and form." Structurally, this parallels the Samkhya's idea of prakriti forming the basis of the world. But Shankara wants to have it both ways here. He wants to support the brahmanic orthodoxy, but he also wants to make use of several ideas that have their basis in the unorthodox schools, the Samkhya and the Mahayana schools in particular. After Shankara, the later Advaitins will assert that maya or avidya is the cause of the world, or that brahman in conjuntion with avidya is the cause of the world. Shankara does not speak this way. For him avidya is an "epistemic" principle only; we might say that it is only "metaphysical" to the degree that it is involved in our conceptual construction of the world, that is, to the degree that it is the root of the transcendental illusion.

As we noted, Shankara is able to have it both ways by ranking "realism" and "illusionism." Now there are some interpreters who have argued that Shankara is actually more of a "realist." As I noted before, I think that we are justified in saying so as long as by "realism" we mean something like the realism of the ancients. Those who argue that Shankara is more of a realist in the general sense do so on the following three grounds: 1. on the basis of the interpretation of "ananyatva" that takes it as saying, "the world is real insofar as it exists in brahman"; 2. on the basis that the world does not "dissolve" with realization; 3. and on the basis that the world "becomes" brahman with realization.

Now, the first two of these arguments can be challenged. The first can be shown to be a propaedeutic view. And the second does not necessarily imply anything, other than the fact that the Advaitins were not pralaya-vadins (who thought the world and the mind "dissolve" with realization). The third point, though, is interesting. It refers to a single tract in Shankara's works, the comments on Brhad Upanishad 2.4.12. There the Upanishad refers to dissolution of the world into the "Mahabhuta" or great reality. Shankara comments that when discrimination arises "the world becomes one without a second" and "merges" with the Mahabhuta. He concretizes this idea saying that this means that one's separate existence dissappears and one returns to the "womb" or own-source (yoni). (In a similar way, at the end of chapter 3 of the Gaudapada Karikas, we read that all dharmas are "always already" non-dual and inherently quiescent.) But the language of "merging" used in the above is metaphoric for Shankara, so I don't think this final point stands scrutiny either.

At the same time, it is necessary to point out that there is indeed a pronounced "realist" streak in Shankara's writings (at least in those writings that were written after the commentary on the GK). Time and again he rejects the "idealist" arguments of the Yogacharins, and he continually refers to brahman as a "vastu" or real thing. More importantly, following an unnamed master referred to at the beginning of the Brahma Sutra commentary, he emphasizes that for the practitioner, the world is real until realization occurs.

A Commentary on The Play of Consciousness, Pt II
from Gaia Community: kelamuni's Blog

We have already touched briefly upon early conceptions of personal eschatology and proto-soteriology in Vedic religion, and we can now relate some of those conceptions to Indian conceptions of cosmology. On page 135 of his book, Muktananda mentions Indra-loka. Vedic mythology speaks of the world of Indra, or Indra-loka and it appears also in later mythology; in the Mahabharata, for example, Arjuna travels to Indra-loka. By Indra-loka is meant, more or less, Svarga, the Vedic "heaven". It is often depicted as sitting atop mount Meru, the "axis mundi" of the Vedic cosmology. It serves as the home of the gods -- much like mount Olympus in Greek mythology -- and as an abode for the blest in the afterlife. [...]

We can see in the classification of the three worlds -- the worlds of men, forefathers, and gods -- an instance of the Indian penchant for triads and tripartite divisions. An even older conception also makes use of a tripartite division. The oldest Vedic texts refer to three domains: an underworld populated by Ashuras, a middle world populated by men, and a celestial world populated by the gods or devas. Yet another conception of three worlds describes a celestial realm, an earthly realm, and an intermediate realm. Brhad Up 5.5.3-4 describes these three worlds in relation to the cosmic person. It says, "bhur is its head, bhuvar is its arms, and svar is its feet." These three terms refer to the three lokas of Brahmanic lore. "Bhu" refers to the earthly world or Bhu-loka. "Bhuvar" refers to the intermediate realm of the air, that is, to the "atmosphere" which is known as Bhuvar-loka. Bhuvar loka, which is between the earth and sky, is said to be a world populated by semi-divine (cf. daemonic) munis and siddhas. "Svar" refers to the celestial realm, Svar-loka, which is the same as Svarga, heaven, or Indra-loka. It corresponds to the sky and is populated by gods. At some point in history, various other lokas are added to these three. The next to be added is Mahar-loka, which is said be populated by Brghu and other saints who survive the periodic dissolution of the lower worlds. Taittiriya 1.5.1 says, "Besides these three, the seer Mahacamasya knew a fourth, called Mahar." Eventually, two more worlds are added to these four: Jana-loka, a term that refers not to a world populated by sexy Kiwi babes but to Brahma's sons; and Tapar-loka, in which deified Vairagyins dwell. Atop all of these is Satya-loka, otherwise known as Brahma-loka, the highest of the lokas, and for some, the domain of release. Eventually, the Indian tradition settles with these seven worlds. Muktananda speaks of a "Siddha-loka" but as we can see here, this could refer to any of the lokas above Bhu-loka.

The Basic Tripartite Structure of Vedanta: We can now return to what is perhaps the best known of the metaphysical triads in the Indian tradition, the division between the gross, subtle, and causal. The three states of consciousness are actually the original basis of this division. Descriptions of the three states occur in various places in the Brhadaranyaka Upanishad. Initially, a contrast was developed between the waking state and the state of deep dreamless sleep. This pairing functioned as a kind of metaphor for the polarity between life and death, with deep dreamless sleep acting as a kind of analog or foreshadowing of the "sleep" of death. Dreaming initially appears as a kind of mediating or "daemonic" third term, a kind of metaphor for the imaginal realm situated between the two, not quite one or the other. [...]

In the Chandogya, the "fourth" self functions as a kind of transcendental ground of the other selves. Although he vacillates somewhat on this point, Shankara generally agrees with Kant, and says that the transcendental self cannot be an object of experience since it is the transcendental condition of experience as such. In terms of turiya, this idea is referred to in Advaita via the dictum that turiya is not a state among other states but the "truth" of the rest. And yet in the Gaudapada Karikas, and elsewhere, this "fourth" begins to be treated as if it were some kind of "state" of consciousness. Karika 1.15 definitely refers to turiya as a "pada", not in the Mandukya Upanishad's sense of a metaphoric "part" of the self, but in the sense of a "state" or "stage". Also, in an explicit sense, turiya begins to designate liberation (moksha) itself. But if this is so, then we have a problem. To use Wilber's terminology, the other three states function as "structures" of consciousness. And yet moksha cannot be a "structure"; it can only be a "stage". Thus, if turiya is moksha, there is a qualitative difference between the first three padas and the fourth "pada". To make matters more complicated, something else enters the picture. Various traditions begin to speak of certain states of consciousness as "transcendent", that is, as states that go beyond conditioned reality, beyond the "world" of samsaric existence epitomized by the first three states. [...]

The Four-Fold Scheme of the Grammarians and Tantrikas: While the tantric traditions such as those of the Naths and Kashmiri Shaivas, accept the three (or four)-fold scheme of gross, subtle and causal states which is derivative of the Upanishads, there is another scheme derivative of the grammarians that is also operative in tantric works. This scheme is the three, or four, -fold division of the nature of mantra. The grammarians had posited that the "word" (vak), in its most inclusive sense, has four dimensions: para vak, the supreme, which is soundless; pashyanti vak, at which stage the word begins to manifest at an intuitive level; madhyama vak, or the middling stage, at which the word manifests at the mental level as thought; and vaikhari vak, which is physical speech. The tantric tradition assimilates this theory of mantra of the grammarians and integrates it with the theory of the three selves of Vedanta. In fact, the tantric traditions incorporate under this four-fold scheme every conceivable facet of doctrine and ritual of their system in a vast edifice of correspondences. The synthesis of the Vedantic and grammarian schemes within the tantric manifold figures most prominently in the works of Abhibnavagupta, the great Kashmiri Shaiva yogin, polymath and philosopher. This four-fold structure occurs elsewhere in tantric literature and can be found, for instance, in chapter three of Jnaneshvar's Amrta-anubhava, The Experience of Immortal Bliss, a work clearly written under the influence of the Naths.

In the tantric version of the theory of mantra, these four stages of the manifestation of the word are associated with the cakras in an interesting way that may seem counterintuitive. The "supreme" vak is associated with the root cakra, muladhara. The "causal" stage is associated with the navel cakra, manipura. The "subtle" stage is associated with heart cakra, anahata, and the "physical" stage is associated with the throat cakra.

In the tantric formulation the term "madhyama" is clearly associated with the mind, either manas or buddhi. This is the domain of the subtle. What, though, does "pashyanti" refer to? Here is my take: The verbal root "pash" means "to see". This particular ocular verb is sometimes associated with the "spiritual" seeing of the ancient rishis. The term "rishi" means, literally, "seer". It was thought that the ancient rishis "saw" the Veda (which means "knowledge") and then composed their hymns and mantras accordingly. This "seeing" is contrasted in the later tradition, which emphasizes the more derivative "hearing" (sravana). The ancient rishis, however, did not hear the Veda, they "saw" it; that is, they intuited its meaning directly. By "intuition" here we do not mean some fuzzy faculty of "feeling", but rather unmediated cognition, such as the apprehension at this moment that we awake. This, I think, is what is meant by the term "pashyanti": it refers to the intuitive mode of knowing in which subject and object, though distinguished, are in direct relation with each other. In Plotinian terms, it corresponds to immediate relation between noemata (Plato's "forms") and noesis (Plato's episteme) within the sphere of nous.

Feb 26, 2009 40.) Spatio-Temporality in Hindu Studies
from Indological Provocations by arvind sharma

The Upaniṣads are a particularly delicate case; the problem, stated in simplified form, has been whether the Upaniṣads were pre- or post-Buddhist. Their subject-matter and method of presentation have much in common with Buddhistic writings; the Pāli style seems, indeed, to be a diluted imitation of the Upaniṣadic style. The secular approach of the Upaniṣads is characteristic also of Buddhism and Jainism, those religions of princes. If we work on the presupposition that in India progress is from the simple to the complex, from brevity to elaboration, the Upaniṣads must be regarded as earlier. This is my own view.[4] Louis Renou, Religion of Ancient India (London: Athlone Press, 1953) p. 7.

February 25, 2009

Heirs of correlationism have shifted towards a theological discourse: Nancy, Derrida, Marion, even Henry

Why Realism? from Larval Subjects by larvalsubjects
I am hesitant to write this post because I believe that metaphysical and epistemological issues should be grounded in metaphysical and epistemological reasons, rather than normative reasons. Indeed, this was one of my main critiques of Deleuzian scholarship in Difference and Givenness: That it was too often conflating normative considerations based on a particular politics with grounds for endorsing Deleuze’s ontology. [...]

Take, for example, the contemporary debate over evolution. The religious skeptic might concede the correlationist argument, claiming that at the level of phenomena or how things appear for-us, evolution is the only plausible conclusion. Nonetheless– and here I’m indebted to Meillassoux’s analysis in After Finitude –the religious skeptic can still point out that this knowledge is restricted to appearances, and that the level of things-in-themselves the world could be organized in a completely different way, along creationist lines. “Since we cannot know things-in-themselves,” the religious skeptic reasons, “there is no reason to conclude that things are as they appear.” Consequently, the correlationist move still leaves open wiggle room for faith trumping what our experimental investigation of nature tells us. If the religious skeptic is committed to revelation as an article of faith (not knowledge), then he will feel warranted in rejecting the findings of these sciences (not that we would ever convince the religious skeptic anyway, but perhaps those in the audience viewing the debate). We find exactly this line of argument in vulgar form among those who argue (with frightening frequency in the states) that either a) Satan put fossils in the earth to mislead us, or b) that God created the world in such a way so as to appear to work along evolutionary terms so as to test our faith (apparently God is an ego-maniac that needs our faith like a vampire needs our blood, according to those who believe such things). But we also find very sophisticated forms of this argument. It is not a surprise, for example, that the heirs of correlationism have, in many instances, shifted towards a theological discourse: Nancy, Derrida, Marion, even Henry in his own way.

I thus think that lurking in the background of the realist/anti-realist debate is this central issue. The realist move– if possible today –attempts to bite the bullet and argue that occasionally we discover a bit of the real and that this real is not just phenomena for-us, but is how things are in-themselves. That is, these things are as they are regardless of whether we know them or experience them, and regardless of whether or not anyone exists. In making this claim it refuses the conflation of the epistemological (the for-us) with the ontological (the in-itself), arguing that claims about beings (the ontic) cannot be reduced to claims about what things are for-us. In part, I think this is what was at stake in the recent arid debate about the status of mathematical entities and whether or not there are mathematical entities that cannot be constructed in intuition. If it is so important to defend the existence of entities that cannot be constructed in intuition– which is entirely different from the claim that they cannot be known –then this is because what is being defended is the position that these entities aren’t simply what they are for-us, but exist as they are in their own right regardless of whether or not anyone exists to know them.

However, it is important to note that this realism would not be a naive realism. It is not being asserted that things exist in-themselves as we perceive them or that we posses an immediate relation to mind-independent objects as they are in-themselves. Following a line of argument advanced by Nick over at Accursed Share, it could turn out that things such as trees, tables, rocks, etc., do not exist as real objects, but instead exist in a completely different way at the level of real and mind-independent being. That’s an issue for ontology to work out. These real objects, rather, are only arrived at through a laborious and careful process in the development of knowledge where many theories are tried out, many motives for pursuing that knowledge are operative, and many of these theories and concepts turn out over time to be mistaken (as demonstrated experimentally, where the real gets to add its two cents with respect to our constructions or models).

It is also worth noting that this realism does not foreclose the possibility of theology or God as in the case of the correlationist move. It could turn out that God exists or is real. However, if things such as evolution describe the real, if things such as contemporary cosmology, geology, subatomic physics, and psychology, turn out to be true, it would also be the case that this God that exists is very different than the anthropomorphic God we find in the revelation of sacred texts throughout the world religions and that we should side with what our investigations into nature show us to be true, rather than what the revelation of some sacred text shows us to be true. From the correlationist standpoint this assertion cannot but be nonsense, as revelation is a matter of faith, whereas science is a matter of how things appear for-us. Thus, as Galileo put it in a less than heroic moment, his claims about planetary motion were not real but were useful fictions that aided in calculation.

As I said at the beginning of this post, I am hesitant to write all of this. If I am hesitant to write all of this, then this is because the desire to refute the religious skeptic is not a legitimate reason for endorsing a particular ontology, nor a reason for dismissing a particular epistemology. If we are intellectually honest, the reasons for endorsing or dismissing a particular ontology or epistemology must themselves be ontological or epistemological in character. Wishing, desiring, does not make something so, and this is the problem we find among ontological and epistemological arguments that are normatively driven such as in the case of those Deleuzians who seem to think they can dismiss Kant because he is a “state-thinker”. Poppycock! If Kant is to be dismissed, then this can only be on the grounds of 1) there being significant flaws in his position, and 2) through offering an alternative. However, while wishing does not make something so, this does not undermine the fact that these supposedly arid and remote issues have consequences that reverberate far beyond what they’re immediately about. I strongly suspect that both Alexei and I agree on the truth of the maths or the sciences, regardless of the fact that he’s an antirealist or correlationist and I’m a realist. However, the realist and anti-realist positions nonetheless have consequences that go beyond these rarified matters.

Private property is the sole guarantor of Liberty

Tuesday, 24 February 2009 Downgraded... As Predicted from ANTIDOTE by Sauvik Chakraverti

I read Kaushik Das' column in today's Mint with great interest...Kaushik is an adherent of the Austrian School of Economics, probably the only one with such a theoretical understanding in the Indian market. He is an economist with Kotak Mahindra Bank. [...]

In case you want to compare, read Pulin B Nayak's column in the ToI of today, supporting Keynesian bullcrap. Professor Nayak teaches at the Delhi School of Economics, and is a "government servant." So you know where not to go for higher education. Congrats Kaushik. Well done. Posted by Sauvik on Tuesday, February 24, 2009

Saturday, 21 February 2009 Thoughts On "Market Day"

We are fortunate that today we also have access to a speech by Vaclav Havel, president of the Czech Republic, at the European parliament. As a representative of a nation that suffered greatly under communist rule, Havel emphasizes the concerns his countrymen have over a European Union that is getting more centralized as well as protectionist every day. Havel says that the EU should have just two functions: one, removing barriers to trade; and two, public goods that cannot be provided for by member nations acting alone or jointly. He deplores the fact that the EU is headed in the opposite direction. He says:

“… the present economic system of the EU is a system of a suppressed market, a system of a permanently strengthening centrally controlled economy.”

He also deplores the protectionism that is rife in the EU. He finds it hilarious that the EU has imposed a 66% import duty on candles from China. It is as if Bastiat’s Candlemakers’ Petition has become reality.Do read the full speech here. This is the kind of politics we need in India. We too should put communism and socialism firmly behind us. Posted by Sauvik on Saturday, February 21, 2009 0 comments

Tuesday, 24 February 2009 The Purpose Of Law

A Rule of Law Society is based on three pillars: Property, Contracts and Torts. Each of these pillars of The Law are meant for the protection and safety of the citizen. With his Property protected by Law, the citizen is secure, his possessions are securely his; and not only that, when he wills his property to his descendants, these descendants are secure and protected too. No bully can interfere and hijack property. As John Locke wrote in 1690: "Where there is no Property, there is no Justice." Posted by Sauvik on Tuesday, February 24, 2009 5 comments

Monday, 23 February 2009 Ban The Police

The Police runs the black markets. And there is no Justice. And there is no Liberty. Recommended reading: Bruce Benson’s “The Enterprise of Law: Justice Without The State.” Ban The Police! Posted by Sauvik on Monday, February 23, 2009 1 comments

Wednesday, 25 February 2009 On Property, Liberty And The Law

We have just discussed the idea that the purpose of Law is to protect. It therefore follows that Legislation is not Law. Legislation is an interference. It takes away Freedom. It empowers the minions of The State. It is an instrument of social control – and is therefore the prime instrument of Socialism, which seeks to perform “social engineering.” All the schemes of social engineers are effected through Legislation.If you want to study this idea further, I suggest Bruno Leoni’s “Freedom and The Law.”

This book influenced Friedrich Hayek, whose “Law, Legislation and Liberty” broke new ground, as compared to his earlier work, “The Constitution of Liberty,” a book that Margaret Thatcher swore by. The future of freedom, which we aspire to, can only be achieved if we restrict Legislation to where it justly belongs: and that is, the regulation of the arms of the government. Legislation should cover the tax bureaus, the police, the civilian administration. This is the “public law.”

The citizenry are therefore free from Legislation. They inhabit the “private law” world of Property, Contracts and Torts. These fall within “civil law” and require no legislation. Of these, it is Private Property that is the sole guarantor of Liberty. When Legislation cannot interfere with Private Property, when Property is inviolable, we are all Totally Free. Posted by Sauvik on Wednesday, February 25, 2009 0 comments