August 10, 2006

Without some metaphysical God or Spirit

Edward Berge Says: August 9th, 2006 at 6:22 am e Just a quickie for now, but the above ultimate (inter)subjectivity seems to me to be participating in the phenomenological myth of the given. As does the notion of involution and involutionary givens, and pure absolute experience outside of relativity. These notions seem part and parcel of the metaphysical assumptions of the perenniel traditions. Granted Ken tries to pare them down to a bare minimum, but it seems to me the later pomo enactments recognized the “ultimate” realm but intepreted it in a more accurate postmetaphysical way. The absolute is always deferred, never present, always a possibility and not an actuality. The latter view acknowledges the possibility of ultimate existence but also the impossiblity of knowing it directly. It eliminates all of the metaphysical baggage Ken talks about, while Ken has to retain at least some of it to get his universe going, i.e., the metaphysical Spirit or Consciousness.
Edward Berge Says: August 9th, 2006 at 7:22 am e For example, I provide below Marcus Honeysett’s analysis of Derrida’s deconstructive assumptions. But he misses the final piece from Derrida’s last work: Deconstruction only denies the conventiional conception of God, not the transcendental altogether. We can come to relationship with ultimate reality with the creative play of possibility, similar to Whitehead’s notion of creativity. Note Whitehead didn’t have some ultimate (inter)subjectivity either, according to Ken.
Edward Berge Says: August 9th, 2006 at 7:42 am e For example, see this article on how pomo’s idea of creative play has parallel’s with Whitehead’s process philosophy, all without some metaphysical God or Spirit. In the Wake of False Unifications: Whitehead’s Creative Resistance against Imperialist Theologies Roland Faber, Claremont, March 31, 2005 Open Integral Integral Spirituality

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